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Understanding the
Ottawa Convention’s
Obligations to

The Ottawa Convention1 is unique for a number of reasons, not the least of which being
that the Convention has linked obligations
concerning the use of a weapon with a requirement that Convention signatories assist
a victim wounded by that weapon. When
the Convention was adopted in September
1997, this aspect, while lauded by diplomats
and activists,2 was certain to be a challenge
to implement. The real work began once the
Convention entered into force and states had
to act on this responsibility. This article discusses in particular the Convention’s victimassistance obligations.
by Kerry Brinkert [ Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

A

rticle 6.3 of the Convention states that “each State Party
in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration,
of mine victims.”1 This provision gave currency to terms like mine
victims, survivors and assistance in the context of mine action and
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Many children who are victims of landmines spend time in the San Barnabé Refugee
Center, waiting for medical attention. During Halloween they can play on the streets
just like any other kids (Bogotá Colombia - 2005).

international law. However, given that these terms are not defined
specifically in the Convention and “arguably the Convention does
not impose an absolute legal obligation upon States Parties to assist
mine victims,”3 the Convention’s membership was challenged with
figuring out exactly what to do.
Understanding the Convention’s Obligations
The Convention’s First Review Conference in 2004  concluded
that “victims include those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or
omissions related to mine utilization.” 7
States Parties acknowledged that such a broad construction in
the definition of a landmine victim would help draw attention to the
entire spectrum of landmine victimization. Yet the attention continues to focus on those physically injured by mines. It was also noted
that “those individuals directly impacted by mines are a sub-group of
larger communities of persons with injuries and disabilities.” 7 This
important point helped the States Parties to understand the need
for a more comprehensive and holistic approach to what the United
Nations has defined as mine action.
The United Nations defines mine action as encompassing five
core elements, one being victim assistance. However, there are important tactical, logistical, technical and medical differences between
humanitarian demining and activities related to assisting in the care,
rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine victims.
Humanitarian demining, developed as an area of expertise dealing with locating and neutralising of ordnance, is distinct from other
humanitarian or development challenges and has developed as a
relatively new and specialised discipline. In contrast, the matter of
victim assistance does not require the development of new fields or
disciplines but calls for ensuring that existing medical systems, social
programs, and legislative and policy frameworks are adequate to meet
the needs of all citizens—including landmine victims.
The problems faced by landmine victims are often identical to
those faced by other persons with injuries or disabilities. Assistance
to landmine victims should be viewed as part of a country’s overall

public-health and social-services systems
and human-rights frameworks.
The matter of victim assistance must
also be addressed within the broader context
of development. While a political commitment is required to advance the quality of
life for mine victims, ensuring a real difference results will require addressing broader
development concerns.
While addressing development concerns
of a group (e.g., landmine survivors), we
must always remember they are diverse individuals with equally diverse needs. The
States Parties have recognized this point,
declaring that victim assistance, as well as
being a matter of collective concern, “is also
a human rights issue.” 7
Another major advance made by the
States Parties was to record an understanding of what exactly is meant by victim assistance. At the Convention’s First Review
Conference, the States Parties reached a
consensus that victim assistance is generally
understood to comprise six elements:
1. Understanding the extent of the challenges faced
2. Emergency and continuing medical
care
3. Physical rehabilitation, including
physiotherapy, prosthetics and assistive devices
4. Psychological support and social
reintegration
5. Economic reintegration
6. Establishing, enforcing and implementing relevant laws and public
policies7
Responsibility
Who ultimately has responsibility for
assisting mine victims? The States Parties
understand that “all States Parties in a position to do so have a responsibility to support
mine victims—regardless of the number of
landmine victims within a particular State
Party.” 7 However, “the ultimate responsibility for victim assistance rests with each State
Party within which there are landmine survivors and other mine victims.” The logic
for this position is grounded in the fact that
“it is the basic responsibility of each State to
ensure the well-being of its population, notwithstanding the fundamental importance
of the international donor community supporting the integration and implementation
of the policies and programs articulated by
States Parties in need.” 7
The responsibility to support mine victims is “most profound in 24 States Parties
in which these States Parties themselves have
indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands of landmine sur-

vivors.” 7 These countries are Afghanistan,
Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia,
Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro,
Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and
Yemen.
This sense of responsibility was underscored in the Nairobi Action Plan, which
noted the Convention’s victim assistance
obligations constitute “a vital promise for
hundreds of thousands of mine victims
around the world, as well as for their families and communities” and that “keeping
this promise is a crucial responsibility of all
States Parties,” with it being “especially the
case for those [24] States Parties where there
are vast numbers of victims.”8 Moreover, the
States Parties recorded 11 commitments to
this “vital promise.” These commitments include that States Parties, “particularly those
[24  nations] with the greatest numbers of
mine victims,” will do their utmost to proceed with specific action points related to all
six defined areas of victim assistance.8
The States Parties’ understandings provided a solid basis to consider that victimassistance obligations of the Convention
could be parallel to the more concrete obligations found elsewhere in the Convention.
For example, with respect to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines,
the Convention’s obligations are very clear.
What must each State Party do? It must destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines under
its jurisdiction or control. For whom is this
obligation relevant? Every State Party that
reports stockpiled anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control must apply this
portion of the Convention.
Following the development of fundamental understandings on victim assistance,
it became much clearer to see what the victim assistance obligation entails and for
whom it is most pertinent. However, while
a sound basis was provided to treat victim
assistance like other obligations, complications still existed.
Seizing the Opportunity
Presented by Understandings on
Victim Assistance
What States Parties still lacked following their First Review Conference was a
clear understanding of what milestones
could or should be achieved by a certain
time. Millions of dollars had been generated between 1997 and 2004 for matters consistent with the aim of assisting landmine
victims.9 However, activists were arguing

Marco Antonio Joaquín was a fisherman before the accident. Now, with the help of the local NGO FUNDEMOS,
he is working in a bakery - Popayan - Colombia

that not enough was being done or being
done well enough.
By not knowing what needs to be done by
key dates or events, the Convention’s States
Parties were setting themselves up for failure. Following the First Review Conference,
the Co-chairs of the Standing Committee
on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration took this as their point of departure, advancing victim assistance provisions of the Convention as if they were other
obligations.
Of course, victim assistance is generally unlike other obligations. It is not defined in the Convention, which means the
conclusions recorded at the First Review
Conference became extremely significant.
The Convention has also not precisely identified with whom the greatest responsibilities
for conducting victim assistance activities
belong. This suggests it is important for the
24 States Parties with the largest significant
number of survivors to take responsibility
for their own victims. Following the First
Review Conference, the task has been to
assign deadlines for victim-assistance obligations paralleling the Convention’s milestones for mine clearance and stockpile
destruction.
In terms of the deadlines, perhaps both
arbitrarily and logically, the Co-chairs
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Toward SMART Victim Assistance
The Co-chairs’ approach to to gauging
and ensuring progress involved the distribution of a comprehensive questionnaire
to the 24  relevant States Parties to help
frame an understanding of concrete victim assistance objectives by 2009; plans
to achieve these objectives; and means to
implement these plans. The main aim of
this questionnaire was to encourage the
24  States Parties in question to establish
so-called SMART objectives:11
• Specific objectives that should specify what these States Parties want to
achieve
• Measurable objectives that would
enable all to know whether objectives
had been met
• Achievable objectives that are truly
attainable
• Realistic objectives that could indeed
be achieved with resources at the disposal of the State Party in question or
with resources that could realistically
be acquired externally
• Time-bound objectives that would
be achieved by the time of the Second
Review Conference
Initial responses to the questionnaire were
presented at the June 2005 meeting of the
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance
and Socio-Economic Reintegration with
all responses summarized in a lengthy
annex to the Sixth Meeting of the States

Parties’ Zagreb Progress Report. It provides
the beginnings of a clearer road map regarding what needs to be done between 2005 
and the Second Review Conference and how
success pertaining to victim assistance will
be measured in 2009.
Overcoming Remaining
Challenges
While the effort undertaken in 2005 
by relevant States Parties was impressive,
the usefulness of the responses is in doubt.
Few States Parties actually responded with
SMART objectives. Some States Parties detailed at length their status. However, even

the idea that “providing adequate assistance
to landmine survivors must be seen in a
broader context of development and underdevelopment.” 7 Many States Parties have
prepared poverty-reduction strategy papers
or national development plans to overcome
broader development challenges, with such
documents containing objectives relevant to
advancing the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors. However, in
many instances, the preparation of victimassistance objectives has not been considered
in these broader national plans.
To overcome these challenges, the States
decided the best way to ensure progress is to
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called for concrete progress to be made by
the time of the Convention’s Second Review
Conference. In terms of clarifying the measures of effectiveness, the Co-chairs turned
the matter over to the 24  States Parties in
question. Clearly, what could be expected
from, or what should be achieved by, any
one of the 24 relevant States Parties would
be different from all others given diversities
in numbers and characteristics of survivors,
bureaucratic and service-delivery capacity,
geography, etc.
As the ultimate responsibility for meeting
the needs of survivors rests with each state,
it was understood they themselves must define what can and should be achieved, in
concrete and measurable terms, as well as
how those needs can be met. Others may
have the expertise and capacity to assist
in understanding problems, in developing
plans to deal with these problems and in
monitoring the efficacy and implementation of plans. Real and sustainable progress, though, cannot be made without the
affected States Parties themselves “owning”
the challenge and the authority for devising
solutions to it.

The “process support” procedure involves
country visits featuring the following:
• One-on-one meetings with officials
from relevant ministries to raise
awareness of the matter and to stimulate inter-ministerial coordination
• Outreach to relevant international
organisations and others to ensure
that their efforts in support of the
State Party in question are both incorporated into and incorporate
mine-victim-assistance efforts
• Inter-ministerial workshops to bring
together all relevant actors to discuss
and consolidate improvements on objectives and the development of plans
It should be noted workshops are not considered as stand-alone activities or ends in
themselves. Rather, workshops are part
of a State Party’s overall process of objective-setting, planning and implementing
efforts to ensure progress by 2009. The
ultimate aim is a true equalization of opportunities for landmine survivors and other
persons with disabilities vis-à-vis countries’
broader populations.
Conclusion
It would be unrealistic to think some of
the world’s poorest countries with some of
the greatest challenges regarding the care,

rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine
survivors would demonstrate perfection in
the establishment of national victim-assistance objectives. Assistance exists to help
countries at risk with these tasks; in accordance with the Ottawa Convention, those
in a position to do so are obliged to provide
it. However, outsiders cannot do it all, nor
should they.
With perfection unattainable, it should
be acknowledged that any degree of meaningful progress made by relevant at-risk
states in taking charge of these matters
will be a major advance. The Ottawa
Convention, after all, was about expanding
the traditional understanding of state responsibility, with states accepting they have
important human-security responsibilities.
Ensuring progress in victim assistance by
key milestone dates, like the 2009 Second
Review Conference, will help demonstrate
the realism of this sense of responsibility.
The work undertaken to date by States
Parties suggests they are on the right track.
However, efforts—and processes—will
have to continue with vigor in order to
make a real and sustainable difference.
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
notes/brinkert/brinkert.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 113
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MASG, continued from page 87

Jhon Ferney lost his leg in a landmine accident running from FARC guerrilla warfare.
Three others died. (Medellin, Colombia - 2005)

MASG Establishes Online Information
Clearinghouse
In an effort to make information more readily available to

though this should have provided a sound
basis for setting objectives, very little was put
forward in terms of what the desired status
would be in 2009. Other States Parties failed
to spell out what is known or not known
about their status. In addition, some States
Parties did not engage in the effort at all.
Another challenge identified in 2005 
relates to the effort to develop victimassistance objectives in conjunction with demining officials who have little interaction
with the health and social services sectors.
In some instances, the actual provision of assistance to landmine survivors appears to be
the responsibility of mine-action structures,
not health-care or social-service structures.
A further challenge related to fostering
an understanding of victim assistance is
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work intensively, on a one-to-one national
basis, with as many of the relevant States
Parties as possible. The aim, quite simply, is
to see the following at the September 2006
Seventh Meeting of the States Parties:
• Those with good objectives will have
developed good plans
• Those with vague objectives will have
developed more concrete objectives
• Those that have not engaged or have
engaged very little in the process of developing objectives and plans in 2005 
will have become more engaged
To achieve the Co-chairs’ aim, some
level of support is being provided to all 24 
relevant States Parties in the form of advice
each may wish to consider in improving on
2005 efforts to establish SMART objectives.

the mine-action community, announcements and resources from
the Mine Action Support Group are now available online. The
Web site is an electronic clearinghouse for MASG newsletters

and efficiently plan their MRE program
through data analysis, thereby reducing
subjective approaches to program implementation. This project will also help move
the surveillance system forward. Results of
this pilot project will be available in May
2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining, facilitates data analysis and effective programming for the government
partners and RaDO.
See Endnotes, page 113

and events, as well as quarterly reports prepared for MASG
by the United Nations Mine Action Service, United Nations
Development Programme, UNICEF and other organizations.
The United States currently heads the MASG, a group of 26
major donor countries providing resources for mine action
around the globe. The U.S. Department of State has given the
task of chairing the MASG to its Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement.
To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit
www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.
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Tel: +1 202 663 0081
Fax: +1 202 663 0090
Web site: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/
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